John Smith 1 worked as a scientist for a large pharmaceutical company in the suburbs north of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In mid-March 2003, on his way home from work one evening, John stepped out of the commuter train station and into a nightmare. As he walked to his car from the station, a robber hit him on the head with a cinderblock. The assailant then robbed John, not only of his cash, but also of his soundness of mind.
After the attack, John fell into a coma. He awoke a few weeks later to a life he did not know. His memory faded in and out. He experienced debilitating fear and anxiety. He could no longer function in his job. He slowly recovered his physical strength, but he did not recover his full cognitive abilities. Unmarried and without any close family, John had no one to take full care of him. Although friends aided him during the recovery, he did not have a permanent caretaker to provide the assistance he needed.
Consequently, John failed to file his 2002 tax return, which came due while he was in the coma. Likewise, he failed to file his 2003 return, which included a few months of salary and several months of sick leave and severance pay. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) eventually sent John letters notifying him of his failure to file the returns. Like so much of the other correspondence John received, he did not know what to do with the letters and he did not respond. The IRS eventually calculated John's liability and sent him a notice of deficiency. When he did file a petition with the Tax Court, the IRS assessed the proposed liabilities. The IRS then sent John the customary collection notices, including the collection due process notice informing him of its intent to levy his assets if he did not address the unpaid taxes.
Although his injuries prevented him from understanding and responding to the IRS notices, John did receive assistance in applying for Social Security disability and began receiving disability payments in 2005. Because John had spent his entire savings on medical care after the robbery, he subsisted entirely on his disability payments. His monthly disability check covered only his essential expenses: rent, food, and essential medical care. The disability payments did not leave him with extra funds he could use to pay down his federal tax obligation.
When John failed to pay his tax debt, the IRS began to levy fifteen percent of his disability payments each month. The levy was a hardship for John because he could no longer afford all of his medication, food, or other necessities. He eventually wrote to the IRS to attempt to explain his situation.
However, the IRS could not understand John's letter, and because of his diminished capacity, John did not respond to any of the IRS's requests for clarification.
After the IRS levied John's disability payments for almost three years, John's friend brought him to the Villanova Tax Clinic to seek assistance in reducing or removing the levy. The clinic contacted the IRS and requested that it stop the levy because it created an economic hardship for John. Initially, the clinic received some resistance from the IRS because John had not filed returns. However, the Tax Court had recently ruled that the failure to file returns did not override the statutory language concerning levies that created economic hardship. 2 The clinic then considered whether it could reduce or eliminate the underlying liability, or at the very least obtain a refund of the already-levied funds. Unfortunately, John had no records, no memory, and liabilities that were long outstanding. Although the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC" or "Code") authorizes the IRS to refund money it has collected in situations of economic hardship, the Code limits the refund to the amount of wrongfully-levied funds collected within the nine months before the taxpayer files a request for a return.
3 Therefore, John could only recover twenty-five percent of the total amount levied from his disability payments. 4 The IRC contains a number of strict time limitations with which financially disabled taxpayers are often unable to comply. In 1998, Congress addressed financial disability within the Code by enacting IRC § 6511(h), creating a mechanism by which these financially disabled individuals could benefit from a suspension of the statute of limitations for filing claims for tax refunds. 5 Congress limited the relief granted in § 6511 to individuals seeking a tax refund. However, the provision does not provide relief to financially disabled taxpayers like John, facing tight statutory time frames in a variety of situations other than just the claiming of a tax refund. 6 Although John's story provides an extreme example of taxpayer disability, a large number of taxpayers face financial disabilities that have a great impact on their ability to comply with the strict limitations imposed by the Code. This 2. See Vinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 392, 401-02 (2009) (concluding that levying the appellant's wages because she failed to file her tax returns was "wrong as a matter of law" because I.R.C. § 6343 required the levy to be released if it created an economic hardship); see also I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D) (2006) (requiring the release of a levy on property if the levy "is creating an economic hardship due to the financial condition of the taxpayer").
3. See I.R.C. § 6343(b) (limiting the recovery of wrongfully-levied funds to the amount collected within nine months of the levy).
4. John could only recover nine out of the thirty-six months of disability payments levied, or twenty-five percent of the total amount. Article argues that the concept of financial disability deserves broader application to allow those afflicted by financial disability to obtain an extension of the statutes of limitations under the IRC in circumstances beyond requests for tax refunds. The Article first examines the definition of "financial disability" in light of fifteen years of judicial and administrative interpretation and proposes expanding the definition to encompass circumstances other than those allowed by the current statute. Part I reviews United States v. Brockamp and Webb v. United States, two cases that led to the adoption of the IRC's financial disability provision. Part II examines the legislative history and scope of the IRC's financial disability provision, § 6511(h). Part III explores three other provisions within the Code that also allow for the suspension of time limitations. This Part also discusses additional circumstances that give rise to financial disability. Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative solution that draws upon features of current statutes and IRS authority and outlines the suggested circumstances in which tolling should occur.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE IRC'S FINANCIAL DISABILITY RELIEF PROVISIONS
The IRC's financial disability relief provisions came into existence primarily in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Brockamp. 7 The request for relief in Brockamp occurred as a result of the Supreme Court opening the door to assertions of equitable tolling against the federal government in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs. 8 The dispute in Irwin began after Shirley Irwin was fired from his job at the Department of Veterans Affairs. 9 Irwin filed an unsuccessful complaint with the Veterans Administration, alleging that he was fired because of his race and an unspecified physical disability. 10 On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed the Administration's decision.
11
After the EEOC sent him a notice of its determination, Irwin had thirty days to file a complaint in the U.S. District Court.
12 Irwin failed to timely file his 9. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 90. 10. Id. at 90-91. 11. Id. at 91. 12. Id. (noting that Irwin had the right to file an employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act within thirty days after receiving the EEOC's determination letter).
complaint, both because of his late receipt of the EEOC's notice of determination and because his attorney was out of the country when notice finally arrived. 13 At the trial and intermediate appellate levels, the government succeeded in arguing that compliance with the statute of limitations was an absolute requirement for waiving sovereign immunity.
14 Because Irwin failed to meet this condition, his complaint was barred for lack of jurisdiction. 15 However, the Supreme Court, instead of deciding the case on this jurisdictional ground and noting the need for greater predictability in this area, granted certiorari "to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government." 16 The Court reasoned that equitable tolling is ordinarily available in suits against private litigants, and therefore that "the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling that applies to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States."
17
The Court created hope for litigants whose actions against the United States did not meet the statutory time frames and whose cases were subject to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Even though the Supreme Court went out of its way in Irwin to announce a clarifying rule in a case that did not merit equitable tolling, the clarity the Court sought to bring with the ruling would not have as wide of an impact as anticipated. The Court's holding was undercut by a case decided earlier the same year, in which the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a tax refund claim filed outside of the statute of limitations.
18 Drawing on this holding, the application of the Irwin rule to federal tax provisions was soon considered, challenged, and rejected.
A. Webb v. United States
Three days before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Brockamp, the Fourth Circuit decided a case that also considered the application of equitable tolling 13. See id. (explaining that Irwin filed his complaint in the district court forty-four days after his attorney's office allegedly received the EEOC's letter, but only twenty-nine days after he claimed to have personally received the letter, which was nineteen days after the date on the letter).
14. Mrs. Parsons lived a life sheltered from financial concerns and relied on her parents, then her husband, and then her sister-in-law to manage her financial affairs. 22 When all of these individuals passed away, Mrs. Parsons turned to Dr. Alvin Q. Jarrett, her personal physician and social acquaintance, to manage her personal affairs. 23 He soon proved that her trust was misplaced.
24 Dr. Jarrett teamed with tax attorney Roland Freasier, Jr. to essentially take all of Mrs. Parsons's money:
Through systematic physical and emotional abuse during the ensuing fourteen years, Jarrett and Freasier induced Parsons to relinquish to them total control over her day-to-day affairs. They persuaded her to move into virtual seclusion in Virginia Beach, Virginia, where they confined her to her bed under heavy sedation. They discharged most of Parsons' household staff and prevented her from receiving mail or telephone calls and from seeing visitors. They also induced her to grant to each of them powers-of-attorney, thus enabling them to manipulate her financial affairs for their own benefit.
25
As they stole her money, Jarrett and Freasier filed a gift tax return reporting the transfers of funds from Mrs. Parsons to each of them, their spouses, and their children. 26 Mrs. Parsons eventually discovered the fraudulent transfers, with the help of an old friend, and brought suit against Jarrett and Freasier in state court to recover the stolen money. 27 Mrs. Parsons also filed a refund claim with the IRS seeking the return of the gift taxes paid, arguing that no gift had occurred. 28 Her suit against Jarrett and Freasier succeeded, but her suit against the IRS did not.
29
Under § 6511, a taxpayer must file a refund claim three years from the time the tax return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. 30 The IRS accepted the basis for Mrs. Parsons's refund claim and refunded the gift tax payments made within the two-year statutory time period before she filed the claim. 31 However, the IRS denied her refund claim on gift taxes paid more than two years before the claim, reasoning that return of this balance was barred by the statute of limitations.
32
Mrs. Parsons's estate brought suit, arguing that the circumstances of this case warranted the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under Irwin.
33
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 34 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[i]f this case had arisen prior to 1990, there would seemingly be no question that the district court's holding was correct." 35 However, the Fourth Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis of Irwin before affirming the district court's decision. 36 The court distinguished Irwin, finding that the Supreme Court premised its holding on the fact that the case involved an employment action under Title VII. 37 Consequently, the court refused to toll the statute of limitations, both because tax refund suits have no private 28 . Id. at 692-93; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Webb v. United States, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997) (No. 95-1360) (explaining that the IRS refunded a portion of the gift taxes and interest paid because no gift had occurred).
29. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 692-93 (hearing the plaintiff's appeal of the IRS's refusal to refund the gift taxes paid more than two years before the filing of the refund claim).
30. I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2006) (requiring the taxpayer to file a claim for a refund "within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later").
31. Webb, 66 F.3d at 692-93 (explaining that the IRS refunded the gift tax and interest payments made within the time frame prescribed by § 6511(a)).
32. , the court found that the statutory structure of the IRC is inconsistent with the concept of equitable tolling. The Oropallo court reasoned that Section § 6511 has two "time barriers": (1) the claim must be made within three years of the filing of the return, and (2) the requested relief must fall within the "outside limit" on recovery, three years before the filing of the claim. 994 F.2d at 30-31. As a result of this structure, the claimant has adequate time to file a claim and is aware of the extent of allowable recovery. 39. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 13, 26-27. The petitioners first pointed to a perceived circuit split, arguing that both the result of cases heard in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and the rationale underlying the holdings differed greatly. Id. at 13-16. The petitioners also cited fairness and administrative issues, noting that the failure to recognize equitable tolling in tax cases resulted in the "wrongful retention" of tax funds. The government appealed to the Supreme Court in both Brockamp and Scott. 62 The Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari. 63 The Court acknowledged that some language in Irwin could support equitable tolling in tax refund cases, but determined that it could "travel no further, however, along Irwin's road, for there are strong reasons for answering Irwin's question in the Government's favor." 64 The Court noted that "[ §] 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form."
65 It determined that the "highly detailed" and technical structure of the statute did not indicate an implicit exception for equitable tolling. 66 The Court noted that tax law generally does not provide relief in the form of case-specific exceptions because of the high volume of returns the IRS must process. 67 However, the Court did not explicitly rule out the possibility that equitable tolling could apply to tax provisions, nor did the Court limit the rule prohibiting equitable tolling of tax statutes to situations involving high-volume IRS activities, like requests for refunds. 68 With these issues still unsettled, taxpayers with other tax issues can still hold out hope that equitable tolling may be available in their cases. 
II. IRC § 6511(h)

A. Legislative History of § 6511(h)
Brockamp revealed the Code's harshness in matters in which a statutory time frame exists.
70 Both Congress and the Clinton Administration recognized that the Ninth Circuit's holding yielded inequitable results. 71 The decision led President Clinton to urge the Department of the Treasury to revise the IRC so that the decision to extend equitable relief in such situations would no longer be left up to the courts. 72 The House of Representatives responded similarly to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Brockamp. In a bipartisan effort, Democratic Representative Robert T. Matsui of California and Republican Representative Jennifer B. Dunn of Washington sought to amend § 6511 to allow for equitable tolling of the statute under certain circumstances. 73 In her remarks on the House floor, Representative Dunn highlighted the "outrageous injustice" created by Brockamp, which she argued could be corrected with a "commonsense change of law." 74 To remedy the problem, the representatives moved to add an equitable tolling provision to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2. 75 The proposed amendment, which allowed for the suspension of § 6511's statute of limitations, stated:
for the period during which it is established to the satisfaction of the determined by a court), (2) the taxpayer is committed to a mental institution or hospital, or (3) to the extent provided in regulations, the taxpayer suffers from any debilitating physical or mental condition which prevents the taxpayer from managing the taxpayer's financial affairs.
76
Despite the representatives' efforts, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 went into effect without this provision.
77
The following year the Supreme Court reached its conclusion in Brockamp, making clear that the injustice Repreesntatives Dunn and Matsui tried to fix in 1996 had come to pass. 78 As part of the Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Congress added a provision to the refund statute authorizing a suspension of the statute of limitations for "financially disabled" taxpayers.
79
For a taxpayer to qualify as "financially disabled," the amended § 6511(h) "requires that (1) the taxpayer have a physical or mental impairment; (2) the impairment be medically determinable; and (3) the impairment bear a causal relationship to the taxpayer's inability to manage financial affairs." 80 However, a taxpayer who meets these conditions will still not qualify as "financially disabled" if an authorized individual acts on his behalf in financial matters. 81 Each of the listed requirements to establish financial disability limits the overall benefit Congress sought to confer and may create limitations greater than intended.
Although the legislative history of § 6511(h) does not specifically identify the origin of the financial disability requirement, it is evident that Congress drew on statutory language from elsewhere in the Code. 82 . Section 6511(h) considers a taxpayer "financially disabled" if he "is unable to manage his financial affairs by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of the individual which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A).
81. I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B) ("An individual shall not be treated as financially disabled during any period that such individual's spouse or any other person is authorized to act on behalf of such individual in financial matters.").
82. McGovern, supra note 80, at 850 & n.286 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 145 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 146-47 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)); H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, pt. 1, at 62-63 (1997) (noting that the legislative history fails to define "financial disability").
which provides a credit for the elderly and permanently disabled, defines "permanent and total disability" as "any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve] months." 83 The language first appeared in the Social Security Amendments of 1956 as the threshold for receiving Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. 84 Section 6511(h)'s definition of "financial disability" significantly limits the circumstances in which this provision applies. Section 6511(h)'s requirement that the taxpayer suffer from a "medically determinable" impairment may define the circumstances necessary to establish financial disability too narrowly, precluding relief in equally compelling cases. 85 By linking financial disability to physical and mental impairment, the statute fails to address other circumstances that raise significant fairness issues. It is unclear why Congress chose to define "financially disabled" so narrowly. 
B. IRS Guidance on § 6511(h)
Section 6511(h) grants the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to require proof of a taxpayer's financial disability. 87 In April of 1999, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 99-21, 88 which "sets forth in detail the 'form and manner' in which proof of financial disability must be provided." 89 According to Revenue Procedure 99-21, a taxpayer must submit two very specific pieces of documentation to prove financial disability. First, the taxpayer must submit a physician's written statement that sets forth:
(a) the name and a description of the taxpayer's physical or mental impairment; (b) the physician's medical opinion that the physical or mental impairment prevented the taxpayer from managing the taxpayer's financial affairs; (c) the physician's medical opinion that the physical or mental impairment was or can be expected to result in death, or that it has lasted (or can be expected to last) for a continuous period of not less than 12 months; (d) to the best of the physician's knowledge, the specific time period during which the taxpayer was prevented by such physical or mental impairment from managing the taxpayer's financial affairs; and (e) the following certification, signed by the physician: I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the above representations are true, correct, and complete. 90 Second, a taxpayer must submit a statement certifying that no other individual had the authority to act on taxpayer's behalf regarding financial matters during the taxpayer's period of financial disability. 91 Any time period during which an individual was authorized to act for the taxpayer must be included in the calculation of the limitations period. Therefore, although the taxpayer insisted on managing her own finances, she designated her son to manage her financial matters and was consequently barred from claiming financial disability.
100
The decisions interpreting and applying § 6511(h) almost unanimously hold in favor of the IRS. The effect that the statute has in causing the IRS to concede to equitable tolling in unclear, because these cases do not become public. Section 6511(h) seemingly has not opened the floodgates to cases involving claims of financial disability because the provision provides only a narrow exception to one circumstance in which a limited time frame can bar full recovery.
Judicial Treatment of Revenue Procedure 99-21
Courts have reached different conclusions on how to apply Revenue Procedure 99-21's requirements for documenting a medically determinable 97 . Id. at *1-2. Dickow and Davis suggest that § 6511(h) may be insufficient to address the complexities of estate tax cases. Similarly, the strict tolling provisions in § 6511 may not be suitable for other complex issues that require lengthy litigation before a refund claim can be filed. Additionally, a majority of courts strictly interpret Revenue Procedure 99-21 and not only require a physician's statement, but also demand that the statement meet a standard of specificity.
For example, in Bowman v. IRS, the court declined to toll the statute of limitations because, although the taxpayer submitted a fairly comprehensive physician statement, the statement was technically deficient for failure to include the dates of treatment or an adequate basis for the physician's diagnosis. 103 The court explained the requirements for proving a medically determinable illness, but noted that "[w]here a physician substantially complies with Revenue Procedure 99-21, technical deficiencies may be cured by a supplemental statement."
104 Accordingly, the court directed the taxpayer to submit a supplemental statement detailing the dates of treatment and describing the doctor's diagnosis. 105 However, the taxpayer failed to provide the additional information, and the court dismissed the claim. 103. Bowman, 2010 WL 2991712, at * 4-5 (reproducing the physician's statement, which certified "that Mr. Bowman, who is 48, has been suffering from years of chronic daily headaches with clear migraine characteristics. They have been intense and daily for over six years with the last two years being more intense even. . . . In these conditions it is understandable that his concentration and productivity is greatly affected and therefore feasible that for medical reasons he has at times in the last years been unable to fulfil [l] The taxpayer subsequently submitted a more thorough supplemental statement. 111 The IRS argued that the taxpayer could not submit a supplemental statement, and that the initial documentation was insufficient because it did not specifically assert that the taxpayer's clinical depression "prevented him from managing his financial affairs." 112 The court held that the taxpayer substantially complied with Revenue Procedure 99-21 by submitting the initial physician's statement and the subsequent supplemental letter, and tolled the statute of limitations. 108. Id. at *5. 109. See Pleconis at *5. Additionally, the district court examined the extent of Pleconis's injuries, noting that he was "able to talk on the phone, watch television, surf the internet, drive to the pharmacy for his prescriptions, and do 'light grocery shopping.'" Id. at *2. This evidence undercut the argument that Mr. Pleconis could not file his tax returns because of his medical conditions. Id. at *6. 
III. CONTINUING EFFORTS TO EXPAND RELIEF FOR LATE FILERS
A. Tolling of Statutes of Limitations Within the Internal Revenue Code
The Code contains three additional statutory provisions that allow taxpayers to toll statutes of limitations. These three statutes provide a potentially useful structure to draw from in building a better and broader financial disability statute.
Section 7508
Section 7508 is part of a series of special tax provisions for members of the armed services that trace their history back to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. 114 Changes to these provisions have generally run parallel to the United States' involvement in foreign conflicts. 115 Congress enacted the first general waiver provision for limitations periods in the Code with the Revenue Act of 1921. 116 This waiver was not specific to individuals serving in combat zones, but it nonetheless addressed the need to extend statutory limitations periods under certain circumstances.
117
World War II prompted the first extension of limitations periods for certain individuals affected by war conditions. 118 The Revenue Act of 1942 added § 3804, which extended "the time specified for the performance of certain acts where the ability to do or perform those acts would or might be affected by the war. certain acts to include those in any period during which any individual traveled outside of the United States for more than ninety days and for an additional ninety days following his or her return. 120 The time extension applied to any individual caught outside of the country during the war, not just service members. 121 Congressional reports noted that extending the statute of limitations was necessary because filing refund claims or paying tax liabilities was "impracticable or impossible" during periods of war.
122
Following World War II, Congress has repeatedly allowed for the extension of certain limitations periods as the United States continues to involve itself in foreign conflicts, but generally only for members of the Armed Forces.
123
Congress revised the time-limit extensions to accommodate individuals either serving directly in, or in support of, the Armed Forces in areas designated as combat zones. 124 Congress also extended these benefits to individuals who are hospitalized abroad for injuries sustained during service in a combat zone. 125 The amount of time the extension grants generally equals the length of service and hospitalization plus an additional 180 days. 126 In 1954, § 3804 was recodified within § 7508. 127 Congress has since revised § 7508 to include individuals serving in specific foreign conflicts. 128 The extension of time created by § 7508 occurs for everyone covered by the statute and does not depend on the discretion of the IRS.
Section 7508A
In 1997, Congress enacted § 7508A, which closely resembles § 7508 in providing broad coverage to a class of identified persons but differs in operation.
129 Section 7508 suspends time limitations within the Code for service members, whereas § 7508A provides the opportunity for similar relief to taxpayers affected by disasters.
130 Section 7508A contains a broad catch-all provision that authorizes the Treasury to promulgate regulations to allow the IRS to suspend the time limitations for actions "required or permitted under the internal revenue laws specified by the Secretary of the Treasury" for up to one year. 131 Congress's willingness to give to the IRS the authority to make decisions on whether and how much relief to grant within the parameters set by Congress shows again that Congress wants to get out of the business of passing legislation with minute details of the nature and scope of relief, similar to a private bill. Instead, it adopts a model, as it did in section 6511(h) and in section 408(d)(3)(I), discussed below, to pass this authority to the Agency. beyond the reasonable control of the individual subject to such requirement."
Section 408(d)(3)(I)
136 Section 408(d)(3)(I)'s legislative history details situations that justify waiver of the sixty-day period for filing, such as the failure to cash checks, "errors committed by a financial institution, restrictions imposed by a foreign country, or postal error."
137 Waiver may also be justified by death, disability, hospitalization, or incarceration.
138 Perhaps because the sixty-day time period is short and during such a short time period death, hospitalization, or incarceration could have an impact on failing to act within the statutory time frame, Congress did not believe a longer period, such as the two or three year period of 6511(h) would merit. Still, Section 408(d)(3)(I) opens the door for additional bases for suspension not considered when Congress passed 6511(h).
Additionally, § 408(d)(3)(A)(i) imposes different procedural obligations. Revenue Procedure 2003-16 requires taxpayers to apply to the IRS for a private letter ruling to obtain relief under § 408(d)(3)(A)(i).
139
If the transaction meets certain safe-harbor provisions, approval through the private letter ruling process is not required.
140 Furthermore, the Revenue Procedure's "[r]equirements for a favorable ruling" provision provides additional bases for suspension, including "casualty, disaster or other events beyond the reasonable control of the taxpayer."
141 The Revenue Procedure also offers avenues for relief that § 6511(h) does not consider. If the taxpayer does not complete the rollover within sixty days, the funds he received from the IRA will be treated as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 408(d)(1). The IRS considers "all relevant facts and circumstances" in determining whether the taxpayer is entitled to the waiver of the sixty-day limitation, including:
[W]hether errors were made by the financial institution (in addition to those described under automatic waiver, above); whether you were unable to complete the rollover due to death, disability, hospitalization, incarceration, restrictions imposed by a foreign country or postal error; whether you used the amount distributed (for example, in the case of payment by check, whether you cashed the check); and how much time has passed since the date of distribution. 
Retirement Plans FAQs Relating to Waivers of the 60-Day Rollover
B. Tolling of Statutes of Limitations Outside of the Internal Revenue Code
Legislative Efforts
Just as Congress sought to expand financial disability relief by enacting § 6511(h), it similarly has revised other inequitable statutes of limitations. For example, in 1998, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company employee Lily Ledbetter brought a pay discrimination action against Goodyear after discovering that she earned significantly less than three male employees in the same position. 143 However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Ledbetter's suit was barred by the statute of limitations, even though she was unaware of the discrimination during the statutory timeframe and did not learn of the unequal pay until years later. 144 The Court concluded that, under the applicable 180-day limitations period, Ledbetter should have filed suit within six months of receiving her first discriminatory paycheck.
145
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling, Democrats in the House of Representatives sought to amend the statute so that the 180-day statute of limitations would restart with each discriminatory paycheck received by the employee.
146 George Miller, House Education and Labor Chairman, stated that the bill "will make it clear that discrimination occurs not just when the decision to discriminate is made, but also when someone becomes subject to that discriminatory decision, and when they are affected by that discriminatory decision." 147 The Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act extended the time frame in which an employee may bring a pay discrimination action by expanding the definition of "unlawful employment practice;" actionable illegal activity now occurs "when a discriminatory compensation or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time, wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid." 148 limitations only for physical or mental impairment that "can be expected to result in death or [that] has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months"). 
Judicial Efforts
Although time limitations in the Internal Revenue Code may not allow for equitable tolling due to their "unusually emphatic" and "technical" language, 149 courts have relied on Irwin to equitably toll statutes of limitations in other areas of law that do. In Irwin, the Supreme Court held that the "rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States." 150 Since that decision, the Court has applied equitable tolling principles in several other statutory contexts.
151
In 2010, the Supreme Court tolled the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
152
Under the AEDPA, an individual in custody generally must file a request for habeas corpus relief within one year from the date on which his or her conviction became final. 153 This one-year time limitation is statutorily tolled for the period in which any properly filed post-conviction relief is pending in state court. 154 In addition to statutory tolling, the one-year limitations period may also be equitably tolled. 155 In Holland v. Florida, the Court held that, because the AEDPA's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, it is "subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling." 156 The Court concluded that, because habeas relief is based in equity and the statute "differs significantly" from the tax provision at issue in Brockamp, the presumption of equitable tolling applied. 157 Consequently, courts have the discretion to award habeas relief to petitioners who would otherwise be denied relief for failing to file within the limitations timeframe.
To qualify for equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner must establish "'(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." 158 Such extraordinary circumstances have been defined as those in which "it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period . . . and gross injustice would result."
159 Although a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable relief in limited circumstances, the judiciary has at least provided a petitioner who files an untimely request the opportunity to argue for equitable tolling. Furthermore, tax litigants may benefit from Holland's "'rebuttable presumption' in favor 'of equitable tolling.'" 160 The holding in Holland signals that future courts may conclude that certain provisions in the IRC are not jurisdictional, therefore providing taxpayers with the opportunity for equitable relief. 
Administrative Responses
Treasury Regulation section 301.9100-3 allows taxpayers who fail to make a timely election for certain administrative, rather than statutory, deadlines to 161. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202-03 (observing that the Court has "tried in recent cases to bring some discipline to the use of" the jurisdictional label). request relief.
162 To obtain relief under section 301.9100-3, the taxpayer must show that he "acted reasonably and in good faith, and [that] the grant of relief will not prejudice the interests of the Government." 163 The taxpayer can meet the requirements of reasonableness and good faith if he:
[1] [r]equests relief . . . before the failure to make the regulatory election is discovered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); [2] [f]ailed to make the election because of intervening events beyond the taxpayer's control; [3] [r]easonably relied on the written advice of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); or [4] [r]easonably relied on a qualified tax professional, including a tax professional employed by the taxpayer, and the tax professional failed to make, or advise the taxpayer to make, the election.
164
The taxpayer must also make the request using the private letter ruling procedure, which, like § 408(d)(3)(I), provides transparency. 165 In the request, the taxpayer must show that he acted reasonably and good faith-consistent with the factors listed in the regulation-and that granting the request will not prejudice the IRS. 166 Section 301.9100-3 also includes a broad catch-all provision for additional relief. 167 Similarly, in 1998, Congress added § 6015(f) to the IRC, known as the innocent spouse provision. 168 The IRS imposed a two-year filing deadline Individuals who seek innocent spouse relief are frequently unable to file their claims in a timely manner. In many instances, the nature of the spousal relationship that creates the need for innocent spouse relief-domination, manipulation, or domestic violence-also leaves the victim in a vulnerable financial and emotional state that makes it difficult to meet statutory deadlines. 171 The cases that address the § 6015(f) regulations have revealed a vulnerable population.
172
For example, in Mannella v. Commissioner, Mrs. Mannella missed the innocent spouse provision's two-year filing deadline because her husband hid the couple's mail and refused to allow her to see it.
173 Although she eventually obtained relief after the IRS withdrew the two-year rule, the court noted that Mrs. Mannella's case warranted equitable tolling. 174 The circumstances in cases like Mannella highlight the need for equitable remedies for taxpayers who miss filing deadlines due to circumstances beyond their control. Addressing this need requires a statute that does not limit financial disability to physical and mental impairment. The IRS has administratively acknowledged the problem and is seeking to work with the bar to find language in its forms and guidance that will meet the needs of this group of taxpayers. 
IV. CRAFTING A SOLUTION
Congress's current approach to suspending the IRC's statutory time frames permits suspension in relatively limited circumstances. These ad hoc sections that address specific, narrow circumstances do not serve the best interests of either taxpayers or the IRS. Consequently, the Code should adopt a broader approach to granting of relief when a financially disabled taxpayer misses a statutory deadline. A statutory solution is a better mechanism for relief than entrusting courts with applying equitable tolling on a case-by-case basis.
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A more expansive system for suspending time periods due to excusable circumstances must have three characteristics. First, the solution must be sufficiently broad. For example, § 7508 and § 7508A essentially allow for the suspension of any time frame in the IRC, which in turn permits taxpayers to obtain relief in any circumstance that meets the statutory requirements.
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Financial disability should similarly apply to a wide range of time limitations. Second, the excusable circumstances for which the statute of limitations may be tolled must be specifically enumerated. Drawing on Revenue Procedure 2003-16 and equitable tolling principles, 178 the circumstances should be broad enough to address all situations in which relief should be granted. Third, in order to conserve judicial resources, the IRS should be responsible for determining whether a taxpayer is financially disabled, subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion.
A. Breadth of Suspension
The legislative history of § 7508 signifies Congress's recognition of the sacrifices made by those serving in combat zones and the hardships those individuals face. The purpose of Section 7508 most concretely applicable to this article stem from the provision initially enacted in 1941; this statute recognized that performing certain acts under the IRC were "impracticable or impossible" for individuals outside of the United States during times of war. While Congress has recognized the need for broad relief from statutory time frames for certain individuals in the military and those suffering from specified disasters, it has not yet initiated comprehensive relief for those suffering from financial disability. 181 Any taxpayer subject to an IRC time deadline should have the right to demonstrate that he failed to meet that deadline because of an excusable circumstance. The breadth of § 7508 and § 7508A make them attractive models for expanding the reach of financial disability relief.
Adopting broad grounds for relief, as Congress did with § 7508 and § 7508A, 182 shifts the focus to the quality of the excuse for missing the time frame, rather than the nature of the time frame itself. Although certain situations may require different, or greater, proof, no time deadline should preclude relief if the taxpayer has a meritorious excuse. Congress could certainly enact different requirements for different sections of the IRC. Late action by the taxpayer, even with an excuse, does not necessarily mean that the statute should grant relief. Rather, a broader scheme for relief simply means that the time barrier for seeking the relief will be lifted if the taxpayer shows a sufficient basis for doing so.
B. Excusable Circumstances
Section 6511(h) provides a very narrow path to tolling the statute of limitations for filing a refund claim and serves as a poor model for establishing broader relief provisions for at least two reasons. First, § 6511(h)'s requirements for relief exclude many of the traditional bases for relief available in equitable tolling cases. 183 Second, Revenue Procedure 99-21 narrows § 6511(h) relief even further with strict requirements that burden taxpayers, especially low income taxpayers. broad base of potential circumstances for the IRS to consider in deciding whether to allow an extended time frame.
186 Congress should adopt a specific set of excusable circumstances and specifically define these circumstances to guide the IRS in its application of the law.
Bases for Relief
Considering the sources described above, the following eight events serve as potential triggering events for suspending of the IRC's time frames: (1) casualty, disaster, or other intervening events beyond the taxpayer's control; (2) mental incapacity; (3) physical disability including hospitalization; (4) death; (5) misleading statements or guidance from IRS; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) domestic or sexual abuse; and (8) diligent pursuit of litigation. Congress has already provided limited relief in the IRC for some of these circumstances, and courts have suggested the equitable tolling principles in domestic abuse situations. A provision for broad relief from statutory time frames should similarly extend to these excusable circumstances.
a. Disasters and Other Intervening Events Beyond the Taxpayer's Control
While § 7508A protects taxpayers in "federally declared disaster" areas, 187 personal disasters-a home fire, sewer backup, or burst pipe-can pose similar or even greater barriers to meeting the IRC's time deadlines.
188 Revenue Procedure 2003-16 recognizes that personal disasters are beyond the taxpayer's control and may be sufficient to suspend 408(d)(3)(I)'s time frame. 189 The same rationale should be applied to other sections of the IRC.
b. Mental Incapacity
Webb and Brockamp demonstrate the devastating impact that mental incapacity can have on an individual's ability to meet the IRC's deadlines. 190 186. These additional bases for relief also draw support from several of the bases for reasonable cause allowing the IRS to excuse late filing of a return or late payment of a liability, e.g., death, serious illness, erroneous advice from the IRS, fire, casualty natural disaster or other disturbance. See DAVID RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON, & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 298-300 (2d ed. 2008). The granting to the IRS of the ability to excuse penalties for late filing and late payment for these bases adds symmetry to the granting of authority to the IRS to excuse other deadlines for action. 193 This length of disability imposes a barrier of inappropriate length. A more appropriate inquiry is whether it is proper to award relief to the taxpayer, not whether the disability continued for a statutorily-prescribed length of time. A short-term disability can have just as devastating an impact on a taxpayer's ability to meet deadlines. Taxpayers should be required to demonstrate that their physical disability caused them to miss the statutory deadline, but they should not be required to prove that the disability continued for at least twelve months. While the duration of the disability may be relevant in proving that it caused the taxpayer to miss the deadline, it should not automatically preclude relief.
d. Death
Under § 408(d)(3)(I), death may necessitate the waiver of a time requirement because the transition from the decedent to the executor of the decedent's estate may significantly disrupt the taxpayer's affairs. 194 While the executor has a duty to step forward within a reasonable time to manage the affairs of the estate, 195 decedent's assets may be subject to litigation, thereby delaying the proceedings and causing the taxpayer's estate to miss a filing deadline. 196 The Code should acknowledge this possibility and accommodate the death of a taxpayer with a more flexible tolling provision.
e. Misleading Statements or Guidance from the IRS
Equitable tolling is available in situations in which the government misled the taxpayer about the statutory deadline. 197 Misleading information therefore should also be a basis for relief under § 6511(h). 198 Congress recognized the potential for the IRS to mislead or provide incorrect information to taxpayers and, with the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, required the IRS to specifically denote the last day on which a taxpayer can petition the Tax Court on statutory notices of deficiency.
199 If the date on the note from the IRS is incorrect, the taxpayer is then permitted to file a petition within the time period promised by the incorrect notice. 200 Similarly, the government should provide a remedy in situations in which its own mistake causes a taxpayer to miss statutory deadlines.
f. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Allowing a breach of fiduciary duty to extend the period for performing a duty allows taxpayers who fall prey to unscrupulous fiduciaries to have additional time to seek the correct result. The loss of a time frame for acting due to the actions of a fiduciary most frequently occurs with minors or the very old. If a breach of fiduciary duty is an excusable circumstance under a broad grant of statutory relief, minors who fall victim to unscrupulous fiduciaries could have the opportunity to seek redress when they reach majority. Often, a fiduciary who missed a filing deadline is unable to make the taxpayer, who lacks capacity, whole. 201 Consequently, a broad grant of statutory relief should provide the injured taxpayer the opportunity to seek relief by tolling the statute of limitations in situations in which relief from the fiduciary does not exist. This provision does not seek to allow fiduciaries to escape liability and make the Government the insurer of the fiduciary's bad action but rather to recognize that vulnerable individuals should not suffer unnecessarily as a result of actions beyond their control.
g. Domestic Abuse
The IRS has acknowledged the special problems caused by domestic abuse by granting equitable relief under § 6015's innocent spouse provision.
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Congress should consider the complications associated with domestic violence beyond § 6015(f) and recognize that domestic abuse could cause taxpayers to miss other deadlines within the IRC. 203 These time frames should similarly be extended if taxpayers can show that domestic abuse caused the failure to timely act. approach more favorable to the taxpayer. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 35.3.2.
201. See McGovern, supra note 80, at 863 (noting that, in situations in which a fiduciary "acts adversely," the fiduciary cannot remedy the taxpayer because he cannot "assert[] a claim against himself").
202. I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309 (expanding the IRS's authority to grant equitable relief with regard to "abuse and financial control by the nonrequesting spouse"). The IRS observed that "when a requesting spouse has been abused by the nonrequesting spouse," under the existing innocent spouse provision, "the requesting spouse may not [be] able to challenge the treatment of any items on the joint return, question the payment of the taxes reported as due on the joint return, or challenge the nonrequesting spouse's assurance regarding the payment of the taxes." Id.
203. See Mannella v. Comm'r, 631 F.3d 115, 117, 125 (3d Cir. 2011) (remanding the case so that the district court could determine whether the statute of limitations under § 6015 should be equitably tolled). [Vol. 62:965
h. Diligent Pursuit of Litigation
Statutes of limitations should be tolled while litigation or administrative proceedings are pending if the taxpayer diligently pursued the judicial or administrative matters. A taxpayer may be unable to file a refund claim or suit until a court has resolved an underlying issue, and the taxpayer may consequently miss a filing deadline. 204 Congress has already provided relief to similarly situated habeas corpus petitioners and permitted tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations for properly-filed petitions. 205 Taxpayers should receive similar relief tolling statutory time periods during certain judicial or administrative proceedings which prevent the taxpayer from timely action.
Standards for Testing Bases for Relief
Both the IRS and the courts need reasonable and administrable standards for granting relief from statutory time frames. The technical medical report required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 provides only one possible model for the standard of relief. 206 The quantifiable standard imposed by the Revenue Procedure aids the IRS in administering a provision that has the possibility of opening a Pandora's Box of unfinished business. However, the standard should not only be quantifiable, but also flexible enough to minimize the difficulty encountered by some worthy taxpayers in providing proof of financial disability.
The medical report required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 places a heavy burden on the taxpayer to procure a satisfactory description of the disability from a physician. 207 This standard precludes relief if the physician cannot describe the taxpayer's condition in a sufficiently specific manner. 208 Rather than focus on the specific language of the expert, whether it is a medical opinion or the circumstance of domestic violence, the standard should take an approach focused on gathering the facts and applying those facts to the basis for relief. The IRS should not require the taxpayer to provide reports with specific language, but should focus on what the taxpayer must prove and then evaluate the evidence to determine whether the circumstance is excusable. The IRS should also specifically identify the proof necessary to establish an excusable circumstance. The IRS should explain how the taxpayer can establish his claim and specifically detail what an expert report must contain.
Both the cases that apply equitable tolling principles and Revenue Procedure 2003-16 take a broader approach, foregoing Revenue Procedure 99-21's narrow, check-the-box path to relief. 209 Under this approach, the IRS and the reviewing court consider all of the surrounding circumstances and consequently have a greater opportunity to achieve a fair result.
C. Mechanism for Granting Relief
Each of the IRC's provisions has its own mechanisms for relief. Section 6511(h)'s process is problematic because it authorizes the IRS to grant relief without mandating disclosure of the decision. 210 If the IRS receiving office or appeals office determines that a taxpayer meets the criteria of § 6511(h)-as elaborated in Revenue Procedure 99-21-then the IRS makes no official notification of the decision, other than to the taxpayer. 211 The only cases that make their way into the public eye involve disputes between the IRS and taxpayers over the application of the relief provision. 212 Most courts engaging in this review have given significant deference to Revenue Procedure 99-21 and the IRS's decision. 213 Therefore, it is difficult to discern what set of circumstances meets § 6511(h)'s requirements and is entitled to a time extension.
In creating a new mechanism for relief from statutory time frames Congress should consider the existing procedures, in addition to other review mechanisms for granting relief to taxpayers. Revenue Procedure 99-21 created a system that operates within existing IRS claims review procedures. 214 This from the IRS's previous decisions. 225 The person seeking a private letter ruling must pay a fee, which assists the IRS in maintaining the system for the rulings. 226 Such a fee could assist in limiting the number of persons seeking relief under the broader grant of relief from statutory time frames proposed herein. However, any fee for seeking relief from statutory time frames must accommodate low-income taxpayers for whom the fee may serve as a barrier to relief. 227 Congress has created two less formal procedures that permit administrative appeals and authorize the Tax Court to review the IRS's decisions: the innocent spouse provision and collection due process. 228 These procedures, which both generally involved low-income taxpayers, could serve as models for a review mechanism for relief from statutory time frames. The IRS could set up a special unit for processing relief requests based on the defined excusable circumstances and provide an administrative appeal of the initial determination, like the innocent spouse provisions. 229 Alternatively, the IRS could authorize the special unit to make the initial determination regarding the request for relief, subject to appellate review like claims under collection due process. 230 In either case, the IRS's decision, if unfavorable to the taxpayer, could result in a ticket to Tax Court for a review of the determination. For transparency, the IRS and the Tax Court could publish decisions, similar to publishing accepted offers-in-compromise. 231 Furthermore, the innocent spouse and collection due process procedures are simpler than obtaining a private letter ruling, which is beneficial to all taxpayers, and especially low-income taxpayers.
The statutory relief provision should adopt a review process that incorporates the benefits of the innocent spouse provisions, collection due process, and the private letter ruling process: the taxpayer should first have the opportunity for administrative appeal, followed by the opportunity for review of the decision by the Tax Court for abuse of discretion. The IRS should publish its decisions with an online system to provide guidance to similarly situated taxpayers. Additionally, taxpayers seeking review should pay a fee for system maintenance. 232 The fee would be waived for qualifying low-income taxpayers.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress has expressed concern for individuals and entities that miss deadlines under the IRC. Yet, it has only provided relief in limited circumstances. More than twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court held that equitable tolling principles apply to federal statutes. Perhaps it was an unlucky stroke of timing that the first IRC provision litigated after Irwin was § 6511 with its many rules. The goal of extending equitable tolling to the Code cannot be achieved without a stronger statement by the Supreme Court concerning the exceptional nature of tax laws. Without broad legislation providing guidance in this area, taxpayers will be forced to attempt to extend equitable tolling to tax cases with piecemeal litigation.
Given its acknowledgement of the role of equitable circumstances in certain, so far limited, situations, Congress should preempt this unnecessary litigation and set broad parameters for the extension of the IRC's deadlines for good cause. By adding a broad provision to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress could control the discussion on its own terms, moving away from the narrow, case-specific relief available under § 6511(h) to the broader type of equitable relief perhaps envisioned by Treasury Secretary Rubin. This type of relief would only award relief to deserving taxpayers who succeed on the merits, which in turn would promote fairness in the tax system and overall compliance. By creating a broader system of relief that is not dependent on equitable tolling principles or subject to stiff administrative barriers, Congress execution, and the file will be maintained so that it is readily available for examination by the public. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 5.8.8.9; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (2012) (providing guidance for offers-in-compromise matters); Treas. Reg. § 601.702(d) (2010) (same).
232. The authors recommend charging a fee of $1,000 or more to reflect the cost to the IRS. It is possible to consider returning this fee to taxpayers whose determinations are favorable. Although this fee would put the IRS in a position in which it could be accused of preventing a favorable determination in order to keep the fee, the IRS would not make its decisions on such a basis and credible accusations of that type behavior would be extremely rare.
could craft a system that serves all taxpayers, not just those with funds to purchase the full measure of justice.
